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With the implementation of the Defense Management Review, and 
publications of DoD Directive 5000.1 and DoD 5000.2-R, the Army was mandated 
to restructure program offices and operating procedures with the intent of cutting 
waste and fraud within the defense acquisition process. The goal was to establish 
an organizational structure which could operate efficiently in an environment of 
shrinking budgets and increasing technical specialization. To address this 
challenge, the Army followed the aerospace industry's lead, and adopted the matrix 
management structure. Since its implementation, the matrix structure remains as 
the management structure of choice within acquisition program offices throughout 
the Army. While the structure has remained effective, its efficiency remains a 
point of contention with many program managers. This thesis focuses on 
evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the matrix structure within acquisition 
program offices. In addition, the comments of 18 program managers will be 
offered regarding some possible methods and organizational variants which can be 
used to improve the matrix structure within acquisition program offices. 
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The current state of industry, in an ever-progressive and competitive economy, has 
led to changes in the operating procedures for many high-technology companies. In order 
for many of these companies to continue to compete amid shrinking budgets and 
streamlined costs, several began to question the normal operating methods introduced 
during the Industrial Revolution. Organizational design, once a simple "one-worker, 
one-boss" concept, has become increasingly difficult to maintain in high-technology 
organizations which must simultaneously provide specialized services to numerous 
customers. Industry had to determine the best method of providing efficient and effective 
relationships between the performances of various technical specialties, while providing 
for the integration and coordination of these specialties into the organizational effort 
required on projects and programs. (Davis and Lawrence, 1977, pp. 2-7) 
Industry was not alone in its quest for increased integration and coordination of 
specialties under conditions of shrinking budgets and streamlined costs. Project offices 
within the U.S. Army responsible for the development and procurement of weapon 
systems and materials necessary to maintain effective fighting forces into the next century, 
faced similar challenges. With the implementation of the Defense Management Review, 
and publication of Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5000.1 and DoD Instruction 
5000.2, the Army was mandated to restructure project offices and operating procedures 
with the intent of cutting waste and fraud within the defense acquisition process. Inherent 
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to this process was an internal review of operating procedures m project offices. 
(Przemienieki, 1993, pp. 53-57) 
The results of the Defense Management Review included a streamlined acquisition 
process designed to cut costs, establish responsibility, and alleviate overlap of systems 
development between services. In addition, it forced internal reviews designed to correct 
mismanagement within acquisition program offices (Przemieniecki, 1993, p. 53). No 
longer would program offices be allowed to escape responsibility for program cost and 
schedule overruns which were causing financial problems of major proportions. 
Management structures were established to oversee specified programs and establish 
responsibility for management. The acquisition "industry" had been forced to enter the 
same environment as private corporations - one of shrinking budgets, streamlined costs, 
and specialized services. 
Looking toward industry, acquisition executives within the Army sought ideas on 
how to make the best possible use of available resources while simultaneously cutting 
operational costs. Faced with requirements for leading-edge technological experts in order 
to gain success in achieving the myriad of weapon systems requirements, acquisition 
executives were forced to conduct reviews of their organizational structure. The goal of 
these reviews was to establish an organizational structure which could operate efficiently 
in an environment of shrinking budgets and increasing technical specialization. The 
aerospace industry was among the first to find an innovative solution. The solution was 
a matrix structure, which attempts to maintain functional specialization while taking 
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advantage of the improved coordination offered by project management. (Przemieniecki, 
1993, pp. 53-57) 
With the adoption of the matrix structure by the Army, several weaknesses 
emerged. These weaknesses continue to plague acquisition program offices today. Until 
solutions to these weaknesses are found, project managers throughout the Army 
acquisition "system" will continue to face obstacles which impede, rather than facilitate, 
effective program management. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
This thesis has the following objectives: 
1. To provide background information on both how matrix organizational structure 
was developed and the general conditions for its use. 
2. To provide information on the various strengths and weaknesses of the matrix 
structures found in both commercial industry and Army acquisition program 
~~. . 
3. To assess current literature, and provide empirical data on methods identified 
by program managers which either can, or have been, used to alleviate matrix 
structure weaknesses. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What are the possible methods or organizational variants which can be used to 
improve or optimize the matrix organizational structure as an effective form of 
management within Army acquisition program management offices? 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
a. What is matrix structure, and when is it used? 
b. What are the published benefits and weaknesses of matrix structures? 
c. What is DoD's posture on the use of matrix structures? 
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d. What are the actual benefits and weaknesses of using matrix structure 
in Army acquisition program offices (based on interviews)? 
e. What strategies are available to make matrix structure more effective 
in Army acquisition program offices? 
D. SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis is to provide information, analysis, and alternative ways 
of optimizing matrix structures within Army acquisition program offices. The objective 
is to propose possible solutions to the matrix weaknesses which generally plague 
acquisition offices. It is the researcher's intent to look at both possible and established 
alternative measures which may offer solutions to many of the problems inherent to 
matrix organizational structures. It is not the intent of the researcher to generate new 
empirical data or to develop a specific model to test the data. The researcher will 
assimilate and correlate the literature and data available and highlight possible solutions 
geared toward optimization. 
E. LIMITATIONS 
The researcher did not encounter any limitations during the course of gathering the 
information and writing this thesis. Credit for this is due largely to the excellent support 
provided by the project managers who were interviewed. The researcher found that their 
input was candid, professional, and extremely beneficial to the success of this product. 
F. ASSUMPTIONS 
This thesis was written with the assumptions that: 
1. The reader has a need for information on matrix structure within program 
offices, its advantages, disadvantages, and methods available for its 
optimization. 
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2. The reader is in a position to incorporate all or some of the methods available 
to optimize matrix structure within their organization. 
G. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for this thesis entailed a comprehensive literature review and 
phone interviews with current and former Army acquisition program managers who use( d) 
a matrix organizational structure within their offices. 
A comprehensive literature search and review was conducted in which over 16 
articles, books, reports, and theses were reviewed by the researcher. The majority of the 
literature was provided by academia, Government organizations, commercial 
organizations, and employees subjected to matrix structures. Although the search was by 
no means exhaustive of the articles that have been published on matrix structure, the data 
reviewed provided an adequate sampling and cross-section of what was available. The 
bibliography contains a listing of the materials reviewed by the researcher. 
Telephonic and face-to-face interviews were conducted with 18 current and former 
Army project managers, as well as Materiel Command managers who have extensive 
knowledge of how matrix has been adopted for use in project offices. The following 
offices provided information to this thesis: 
1. Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) 
2. Armored Gun System (AGS) 
3. . Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems (BFVS) 
4. Bradley Fire Support Vehicle (Bradley Fist) 
5. Comanche 
6. Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System/Ground Station Module 
(JSTARS/GSM) 
7. Air-to-Ground Missiles (AGMS) 




10. Multiple Launch Rocket System/Precision Guided Munitions (MLRS/PGM) 
11. Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) 
12. Joint Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (JTUAV) 
13. Testing Facility, Yuma Proving Grounds 
14. Integrated Material Management Center, Missile Command 
The following is a sample list of general questions that were asked during the 
interview: 
1. What are the benefits that you receive from the matrix structure in your 
project office? (examples: cost savings, ability to operate in an environment 
consisting of scarce resources, ability to hire/fire workers rapidly, etc.) What 
are the weaknesses? 
2. What has driven you to use matrix organizational structure within your project 
office (TDA determined by PEO policy, level of funding, type of program, 
Government employee utilization, etc)? 
3. What formal and informal feedback methods have you invoked. (or could your 
command invoke) to obtain information on the quality of support provided to 
you by the materiel commands? Do these systems work? Are there other 
methods which you would suggest? 
4. Within your program's matrix structure, are your matrix support personnel 
physically co-located at your program office or are they located elsewhere (at 
the materiel command headquarters), or both? What are your thoughts regarding 
this situation? 
5. Have you experienced the ability to quickly replace or add new matrix 
personnel support to your program when necessary? 
6. Do you feel that current solutions to the rating scheme for matrix personnel (ie, 
including you, as the PM, into the rating scheme) allow you to influence matrix 
worker performance and potential for increased responsibility? Do you feel this 
type of solution should be implemented for awards as well? 
7. If given the opportunity, what strategies would you incorporate to make matrix 
structure more effective in Army acquisition program offices (ie, changes in 
existing policy, changes in organizational forms, etc)? 
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H. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is organized around five chapters. Chapter I provides a brief 
introduction and outlines the objectives and research questions of the thesis. The chapter 
establishes the framework and ground rules for the thesis in terms of scope, limitations, 
assumptions, and methodology. 
Chapter II introduces the reader to the concept of matrix organizational structure, 
provides a definition, conditions for use, and concludes with DoD's perspective on the use 
of matrix structures in Army acquisition program offices. Included in Chapter II is an 
example of one project office's incorporation of matrix structure: the Army's Tactical 
Missile System. 
Chapter III discusses several published advantages (dual environmental demands, 
flexible use of specialized personnel, adaptability to external change, and personal skills 
development) and disadvantages (authority ambiguity, management conflict/power 
struggles, worker conflict and confusion, communication, and anarchy) of matrix structure. 
The objective of Chapter III is to introduce the reader to the potential assets and liabilities 
inherent in matrix structure. 
Chapter IV contains data gathered from interviews concerning matrix structure's 
current strengths and weaknesses as observed in Army acquisition program offices. 
Additionally, this chapter provides data on how both current and former PMs have 
successfully alleviated many of the weaknesses found within the matrix organizational 
structure in order to fully optimize the organizational form. Published methods of 
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weakness resolution are included as well, in order to provide a more comprehensive 
source of available information. 
Chapter V is a summary of the thesis and answers the primary and subsidiary 
research questions that were asked in Chapter I. Specific recommendations are offered 
by the researcher for improving the matrix structure within Army acquisition project 
offices. Two ru:~as for further research are then identified and discussed. The thesis and 
the cha~ter are wrapped up in a final conclusion. 
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II. BACKGROUND ON MATRIX ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Like any other ingredient involved in successful business operations, 
organizational structures are developed in order to provide for a need present in the 
business environment. Management's ability to choose the right structure, and tailor it to 
the company's strategic planning and personnel, often determines business success or 
failure. If management is to succeed, it must carefully pinpoint its company goals and 
choose an organizational structure which places its people in the best position to achieve 
them (Meares, 1993, p. 14). Managers in charge of modem business-oriented 
organizations generally classify organizational structures into one of three basic 
categories: project, functional, or matrix. While the thrust of this thesis is devoted 
toward defining and describing the matrix organization, a basic understanding of both 
functionl}.l and project organizations is necessary in order to fully comprehend the 
complexities associated with matrix organizations. 
B. FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION 
A functional organization is defined as an organization in which individuals with 
specific technical skills are placed in specialized departments (engineers are placed in an 
engineering department, persoimel experts are placed in a personnel department). This 
grouping of resources according to a given specialty allows experts to work together in 
order to provide one particular function or task. (Przemienieki, 1993, pp. 53-57) As 
shown in Figure 2.1, the functional structure is characterized by an organizational 
reporting method consisting of direct line authority to progressively higher level managers 
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in each functional area. The top line functional managers all report to the single general 
manager, and project work is subdivided and allocated at the lowest possible management 
level. This allows each functional grouping to work on several projects simultaneously. 
(Skowrenek, 1976, pp. 5-8) 
GfifRIJ. 
MANAGeR 
MANAGeR Of MANAGfROf MMIAGfROf 
fNGINHRING MANUFACTURING SfR~CfS 
l l I I I I 
flfCTRICIJ. MfCHI/liCIJ. SOFTWARE l.iSfiBLY TEST CONIROL IIIIAHING PUPLICAIIONS TRA!11NG i 
I 
I 
PRO~CTA A i i A A i i i 
PRO.mB B B B B B B B B 
PRO!CTC c c c c c c c c 
m. m. m. m. m m. m. m m 
Figure 2.1. Functional Organization (Losi, 1977, p. 6). 
The functional structure is a proven type of organizational method for corporations 
which conduct routine technology and require interdependencies in functional areas. 
Projects developed under this structure are normally numerous, small, and of relatively 
short duration (Skowrenek, 1976, p. 8). There are several advantages inherent within the 
functional structure. First, functional structures offer corporate memory which becomes 
self-sustaining within each functional base. Failures and lessons learned during earlier 
projects are accessible to everyone, and ready access to experience is a commonality 
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shared under this organizational form (Patterson, 1978, p. 9). Another advantage of the 
functional structure is that it provides the specialized skills and capabilities necessary to 
deal with sophisticated technology on a small number of products or projects. However, 
as the number and diversity of projects increases, the ability to complete each task on 
time, and with appropriate quality, becomes increasingly difficult. (Losi, 1977, p. 5) 
Plagued with the inability to respond to project schedules, aerospace corporations, 
and later their counterparts in Government, began searching for a better form of 
organization. The goal was to find a structure which was responsive to both accelerated 
technology and the demands of high priority programs and clients (Patterson, 1978, p. 9). 
The development of the project structure commenced. 
C. PROJECT ORGANIZATION 
Project organizations evolved in the 1960's and were used extensively on the 
nation's space projects. This type of organization is based on the construction of teams 
consisting of experts from numerous disciplines who are grouped together to complete a 
single project or program. The goal-oriented foundation of this organizational form 
enables the project manager to achieve program coordination while responding 
successfully to program schedules. Armed with an arsenal of experts, the project 
manager of the team has all the necessary technical and functional area personnel required 
to take on a project from start to finish, without having to rely on other resources. 
(Przemienieki, 1993, pp. 53-57) Additionally, the project manager is delegated full 
responsibility for the development of the project, including authority to plan, coordinate, 
control, and concentrate any resources required to meet the challenging project needs 
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(Losi, 1977, p. 3). Figure 2.2 illustrates a typical project organization found m an 
industrial product division. 
ll:NERAL 
IIANAGER 
PROJECT A PROJECT B PRUiECT C 
MANAGER IIANAGER IMIIAIIR 
I l I l I I 
ENGINEERING MANUFACTURE SERVICE ENGINEERING MANUFACTURE SERVICE ENGINEERING IIANUFACTURE SERVICE 
ElECTRICAL ASSEMBLY DRAFTING ELECTRICAL ASSEMBLY DRAFTING ELECTRICAL ASSEIIILY DRAFTNG 
MECHANICAL TEST PUBLISHING MECHANICAL TEST PUBLISHING MECHANICAL TEST PUBLISHING 
ETC CONTROL TRNNING ETC CONTROL TRNNING ETC CONTROL TRNNING 
ETC ETC ETC ETC ETC ETC 
Figure 2.2. Project Organization (Skowronek, 1976, p. 6). 
Project organization is often favored by commercial companies for the 
development of new products, building a factory, or investigating areas that depart from 
their traditional businesses. Generally, this form of organization is used for one-time 
undertakings that are infrequent, unique, or unfamiliar to the parent organization. 
(Skowrenek, 1976, p. 5) While no one will contest the successful use of project 
organizations during the early space exploration era, project organizations are noted for 
weaknesses as well. First, project organizations are often very expensive to operate as 
the costs and resources associated with acquiring and paying core specialists for each 
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project are tremendous. Next, project structures can affect employee morale. While 
functional organizations provide a degree of stability, project offices are characterized as 
short duration, with uncertain futures for project members upon project completion. 
(Meares, 1993, pp. 14-15) Finally, one weakness inherent in project organizations is the 
tendency for project managers to retain their best and most experienced people in the 
project itself. This tendency often stifles opportunities for sharing lessons learned. 
(Patterson, 1978, p. 1 0) 
It is important to note that in both project and functional organizations, traditional 
management precepts of unity of command, superior/subordinate lines of authority, and 
functional division of labor, are preserved by the organizational structure (Losi, 1977, p. 
5). This concept changes significantly under the matrix structure. 
D. MATRIX ORGANIZATION 
Due mainly to the shortcomings of both functional and project organizations, 
aerospace and defense organizations continued to search for a new organizational 
structure. The intent of this quest was to develop and establish a stable and long-lasting 
organization which was capable of implementing the strengths of both the functional and 
project organizations into a market consisting of uncertain environments, unique 
technology, and specialized goals. (Patterson, 1978, p. 11) The search led to the matrix 
organization, which evolved from a combination of both functional and project 
organizations. 
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1. What is Matrix Organization? 
In their book Matrix, authors Stanley Davis and Paul Lawrence define a matrix 
organization as any organization that employs a multiple command system that includes 
not only a multiple command structure, but also related support mechanisms, and an 
associated organizational culture and behavior pattern. Simply put, it is the process of 
establishing a totally new organization in which individual workers fall under one 
manager (department head) while working as part of a concerted effort (defined as a 
project) under a different manager (project manager). Thus, matrix organizations employ 
a "two-boss" or multiple command structure as opposed to the conventional "one-boss" 
system. (Davis and Lawrence, 1977, p. 3) A typical matrix organization is depicted in 
Figure 2.3. 
I I 1 
I 
8'.131N:EAN3i I CCNTRoi'CTS I ,~N3i I R....N::TlCJ\IAL R....N::TlCJ\IAL R..J'-cllCJ\IAL CIVISICN CNISICN DMSICN 
H FR::l..ECr IVI"N"G'3"3 I R=H H=H= A 
•• •• •• 
H FR::l..ECr IVI"N"G'3"3 I ~ r=I=H= H-++ B 
•• •• •• 
Figure 2.3. Matrix Organization (Przemienieki, 1993, p. 57) 
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Is the matrix system appropriate for all industry? The answer is no. Matrix 
organizations are established only when appropriate conditions exist within the industry's 
service sector. As a rule of thumb, Davis and Lawrence point out three conditions which 
should exist within an industry for it to consider implementation of a matrix organization. 
These three conditions are: outside pressure for dual focus, pressure for high information-
processing capacity, and pressure for shared resources. (Davis and Lawrence, 1977, pp. 
11-17) 
2. Conditions for Use 
a. Outside pressure for Dual Focus 
Conventional organizations have historically focused human energy by 
grouping people into different organizational units with defined boundaries and common 
bosses which serviced a small, well-defined set of customers. Additionally, conventional 
organizations often center around technical specialties (engineering, research and 
development, manufacturing, logistics, etc.) which enable group members to reinforce 
each other's technical proficiency. Matrix organizations were developed because there 
was a unique need to satisfy each of these requirements simultaneously. (Davis and 
Lawrence, 1977, pp. 11-13) In other words, attention had to focus both on complex 
technical issues and on the project requirements of the customer. In this case, each 
requirement is a priority, and neither can overrule the other. Managers were placed in 
charge of each project and in charge of each section (engineering, research and 
development) specialty. This dual command structure induces simultaneous decision-
making and a balance of power between each manager. 
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b. Pressure for High Information-Processing Capacity 
The second condition which suggests the use of a matrix organization is 
that the industry's organizational members have a high requirement for information-
processing capacity. Under conventional management, the organization establishes 
procedures and policies for passing communications and information between levels. A 
hierarchy is established which directs information to the appropriate office. (Davis and 
Lawrence, 1977, pp. 14-16) However, what happens when the information load is 
extremely large and complex? Decision-makers become overloaded with input regarding 
decisions on numerous projects without having full knowledge of any particular one. 
Matrix organizations are designed to alleviate many of the problems of this information-
processing nightmare. Decisions are inherently made at the project manager and 
department head level, thus alleviating the long waiting time associated with top-level 
(Chief Executive Officer) organizational decisions. Used correctly, the matrix design 
develops people to take on a greater general management role and increases the 
organization's information-processing capacity. (Davis and Lawrence, 1977, pp. 14-16) 
c. Pressures for Shared Resources 
The final condition which merits consideration for an organization's 
adoption of matrix structure is the pressure associated with ensuring full utilization of 
resources (labor and capital) and meeting high performance standards demanded by 
customers (Davis and Lawrence, 1977, pp. 17-18). To compete in high-technology 
industries, corporations must make full use of capital and labor resources. Each of these 
resources is associated with a cost to the corporation. Technical expertise as well as the 
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capital resources necessary to produce high-technology products are often wasted during 
down periods (Davis and Lawrence, 1977, pp. 17-18). As one project is completed or 
under a "stop work" status, labor and capital resources sit idle waiting for another 
assignment. Cutting the "down" time associated with these resources is a primary concern 
within any corporation. Matrix organization can provide an .answer to this situation. 
Under the matrix design, as one project is completed or in a hold status, human and 
capital resources are shifted to other on-going projects with reduced loss in labor hours. 
Similarly, specialized equipment is shared by many separate projects simultaneously using 
a scheduled timeline. (Davis and Lawrence, 1977, pp. 17-18) For example, an aerospace 
industry's wind tunnel can be used by numerous projects (rotary wing, fixed wing, and 
research and development) and departments on a continual basis, even if one project is 
cancelled. The ability to make maximum use of these human and capital resources on 
a continual basis is a key facet of matrix organizations. 
E. DoD PERSPECTIVE /POLICY ON MATRIX ORGANIZATION 
One of my subsidiary research questions addressed how DoD acquisition programs 
are organized: in other words, what policies or directives dictate how a program office 
is organized? Both Army Regulation 70-1, Army Acquisition Policy, and Army 
Acquisition Executive (AAE) Policy Memorandum 91-4, Matrix Support Policy for 
Program Executive Officer Managed Systems, provide insight to the question. Army 
Regulation 70-1 consolidates the offices involved in the acquisition process into two 
distinct categories: program management and program supporting. The first of these 
categories is program management, which consists of Program Executive Officer offices. 
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According to AR 70-1, Program Executive Officers (PEOs) and program managers 
(members of the Program Executive Officer organizations) are given the authority and 
resources to manage program cost, schedule, and performance. (AR 70-1, 1993, p. 11) 
In other words, Program Executive Officer organizations make up what is commonly 
referred to as the supported commands. 
The second category identified by AR 70-1 is the program supporting commands. 
This category includes the Army Materiel Command (AMC), the United States Army 
Information Systems Command (USAISC), and the United States Army Strategic Defense 
Command (USASDC). According to AR 70-1, the mission of these "materiel commands" 
is to provide the support needed by the PEOs in such a way as to ensure program success. 
The support provided by the materiel commands consists of both material and personnel. 
(AR 70-1, 1993, p. 11) Therefore, the materiel commands make up the functional base, 
and are responsible for providing the "personnel pools" from which matrixed workers are 
drawn as program offices are established. 
In terms of acquisition program accountability, the Packard Commission and the 
Defense Management Review suggested that a more efficient and accountable work force 
was necessary to improve systems acquisition. In response to these findings, AR 70-1 
states that the PEO or program manager (PM) has the ultimate accountability for mission 
accomplishment until transition to fielding. Accordingly, the PEO is accountable for 
directing the development, acquisition, developmental testing, modification, and fielding 
of assigned programs. Materiel commands, on the other hand, are held accountable for 
material release and the quality and completeness of the functional tasks and activities 
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which support the PEO. Program success, then, is based on the materiel commands' 
matrix support which serves to unify the PEOs and the materiel commands into a team 
effort dedicated to the development and fielding of weapon and information systems. 
(AAE Policy Memorandum 91-4, 1991, pp. 1-3) 
While these two publications provide guidance on overall responsibility and 
accountability, they still do not completely answer the question of how a program office 
is organized. Based on interviews with senior officials, the organization of program 
offices differs among Program Executive Officer offices throughout the Army. As 
program offices are established, each PM has both a core set of personnel and a set of 
supporting matrixed personnel. The guidance that PMs have received to organize their 
offices is the organizational Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA), which is 
dictated by each PEO office. Therefore, while it may be ideal to have each PM decide 
on the type of organizational structure, and amount of matrix support his organization 
needs, he is normally forced to manage with the type of structure and authorized TDA 
dictated by his parent organization (i.e. the philosophy of the PEO, and other senior DA 
and DoD managers). Other influences which may contribute to determining the type of 
organizational structure and the organization's TDA include: type of program, budget, and 
Government employee utilization. (Matthews, 1995) 
To illustrate the organization of a typical program office, Figure 2.4 displays the 
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Figure 2.4. Army Tactical Missile Project Office, March 1994 (Matthews, 1995). 
As shown in the diagram, more than half of the organization' personnel are matrixed from 
the supporting materiel commands throughout the Department of the Army (DA). 
Divisions containing matrixed personnel include Configuration Management, Product 
Assurance, Test, Systems Support, Technical Management, and the Security office. 
While Figure 2.4 represents a typical program office, it is not necessarily 
representative of all program offices under the various PEO offices. As stated earlier, 
each PEO's philosophy regarding organization differs. Therefore, standardization within 
program offices does not exist. Instead, each PEO is held accountable for directing the 
development, acquisition, modifications, and fielding of assigned programs. The type of 
structure used by PEOs to accomplish these tasks, however, is predominately matrix. 
(Matthews, 1995) 
Thus, while matrix structure iS-not necessarily dictated, it is more prevalent. This 
is. due primarily to the factors presented earlier. The type of program has a tremendous 
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effect on what type of organization is chosen. Most acquisition technologies require 
highly technical specialization, and by definition, require matrix organization. Because 
Research and Development dollars are in short supply due to DoD downsizing, many 
program offices cannot afford to maintain large, experienced staffs. Therefore, they must 
use matrix personnel to provide budget flexibility. In addition, there is a strong emphasis 
to keep DoD civilian employees active. In other words, when a portion of a project is 
completed, matrix personnel are returned to their functional bases and proceed on to other 
projects as required. If program offices were structured differently, such as a project-
oriented structure, movement between cycles of a program could require implementation 
of reduction in force (RIF) procedures. It is readily seen why the majority of PM offices 
are structured as matrix organizations. PM's are more or less forced into this structure 
by the factors presented, rather than any policy or regulation. (Matthews, 1995) 
1. Matrix Support Plan 
While AR 70-1 and AAE Policy Memorandum 91-4 do not explicitly dictate 
program office organization, they do provide policy on matrix support implementation. 
Each states that in order for the PEO or PM and the materiel commands to carry out their 
tasks, a plan is necessary to delineate the relationship between the two parties. This plan 
is normally in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which contains the 
functional tasks required by the PEO, the funds to be provided, and the manner in which 
the materiel command will accomplish the tasks. Additionally, the PEO or PM must 
coordinate the Program Baseline Agreement with the appropriate materiel command in 
order to ensure that program tasks are properly supported. Finally, the PEO or PM is 
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required to identify program tasks needed to successfully accomplish their mission (by 
preparation of a series of integrated support plans such as the Integrated Logistical 
Support Plan, the Configuration Management Plan, the Systems Engineering Master Plan, 
and the Test and Evaluation Master Plan.). This step is crucial in order for the materiel 
command to identify all resources necessary to ensure accomplishment of the tasks. (AR 
70-1, 1993, p. 11) 
As with any "living document", the support plans are updated as necessary to 
incorporate any modifications as plans change. If resource requirements change, the 
funding and schedule are changed appropriately in order to take into account differences 
in total funding amounts. It is important to note that support plans are joint documents, 
and therefore, changes cannot be made unilaterally. (AR 70-1, 1993, p. 11) 
2. Personnel Management and Resolution of Functional Conflicts 
To help alleviate some of the pathologies involved with matrix structure, both AR 
70-1 and AAE Policy Memorandum 91-4 provide guidance for personnel management and 
the resolution of functional conflicts. One pathology of matrix structure includes 
personnel management (see Chapter III Matrix Strengths and Weaknesses). In order to 
alleviate problems with performance evaluations of matrix support personnel, AR 70-1 
provides that while materiel commands have overall responsibility for the performance 
evaluation of the matrix personnel they provide to the PEO or PM, PMs must have the 
ability to influence these evaluations. (AR 70-1, 1993, p. 11) This is based on the PM's 
overall accountability for mission accomplishment of their assigned systems. This 
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inclusion of the PM into the rating scheme of matrixed workers provides him with the 
ability to influence each worker's performance and potential for increased responsibility. 
Another pathology found in matrix organizations is conflict. AR 70-1 and AAE 
Policy Memorandum 91-4 provide guidance concerning the resolution of functional 
conflicts. Each state that resolution of issues is to occur at the PEO/PM and local 
materiel command level for the mutual benefit of all involved. However, when resolution 
at lower levels is impossible, regulations state that the conflict is to be elevated through 
the PEO and materiel command chains to the AAE for final resolution. (AR 70-1, 1993, 
p. 11) 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced the concept of matrix organizational structure and its 
evolution as an organizational form. In .an attempt· to understand the complexities 
associated with matrix structure, a thorough discussion of both functional and project 
structures was included. Discussion emphasized that the matrix structure was developed 
in an attempt to take advantage of the strengths while minimizing the weaknesses of both 
the functional and project structures. The matrix was defined, as an organizational 
structure in which individual workers fall under one manager (department head of a 
functional division) while working as part of a concerted effort (defined as a project) 
under a different manager. Next, the chapter discussed several prerequisite conditions 
which are necessary for an organization's management to consider before adopting a 
matrix structure. These conditions include: outside pressure for dual focus, pressure for 
high information-processing capability, and pressure for shared resources. 
23 
Finally, the chapter discussed DoD's perspective and policy on matrix 
organizational structure. While published regulations give little guidance on how program 
offices are to be organized, they do provide numerous qualifications on how PEOs/PMs 
and materiel commands are to work together as part of a unified effort to develop and 
field weapon and information systems. An example of a typical program office was 
presented in order to show the amount of matrixing which is common among many PEO 
offices. The chapter ended with a discussion of two Army policies which are designed 
to alleviate some of the pathologies common to matrix structure. An in-depth discussion 
of matrix strengths and weaknesses will be the focus of Chapter III. 
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ill. MATRIX ORGANIZATION STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Now that I have defined matrix structure, and gtven conditions for its 
implementation into an organization, it is time to identify and discuss matrix strengths and 
weaknesses. As discussed earlier, matrix structure was adopted by aerospace and defense 
organizations in an attempt to retain the benefits of both the functional and project 
organizations while avoiding their inherent disadvantages (Patterson, 1978, p. 11 ). 
Therefore, an organization's success under matrix depends on management's ability to 
take advantage of the structure's strengths while, simultaneously, limiting its negative 
aspects or weaknesses. The intent of this chapter is to describe and discuss some of the 
more prevalent matrix structure strengths and weaknesses found within both commercial 
and DoD organizations. 
B. MATRIX STRENGTHS 
Once an organization determines a need to evolve into a matrix, the leadership 
needs to evaluate the benefits and costs associated with matrix organization evolution. It 
must be reemphasized that matrix is not for every organization. Nor is any one form of 
matrix readily adaptable to various organizations. 
Many of the reasons identified for creating a matrix organization are benefits in 
themselves. Some of them however could use further definition. 
1. Manage Dual Environmental Demands 
The capability to manage dual environmental demands was one of the primary 
reasons that matrix organizations were developed. The matrix was designed to assimilate 
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the processing of a huge volume of information from vanous projects while 
simultaneously providing overall management for the entire organization. The goal is to 
provide undivided human resources to various tasks or projects simultaneously. (Davis and 
Lawrence, I977, p. 13) The key word being undivided: ensuring that an employee is not 
required to split his talents among various jobs at the same time. 
Conventional organizational designs flowed decision-making to upper management. 
As organizations, especially those in high-technology industries, developed and 
diversified, the number of critical decisions requiring management action grew 
exponentially (Davis and Lawrence, I977, p. II). Upper management soon became 
inundated with decisions on specific projects or technologies that they were unfamiliar 
with. The end result was poor, uninformed decision-making. The matrix design is 
intended to empower decision-makers at· lower levels than conventional functional 
organizations. This structure forces authority and responsibility down to the specialist 
level. Therefore, a positive aspect common to matrix structures is that decisions are 
more timely and accurate and invoke personal involvement and employee commitment. 
(Davis and Lawrence, I977, p. I4) 
Regardless of good intentions, decision-making is only accelerated if more decision 
authority is delegated to decision makers at the program level. In weapon systems 
acquisition, where decision-making is a highly-structured and jealously-guarded 
prerogative, significant decision-making authority is maintained at least one level, and 
often several levels, above the program manager (Patterson, pp. 12-13). Thus, while 
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matrix is designed with the intent of taking advantage of lower level decision-making, 
proper implementation is still in the hands of management. 
2. Flexible Use of Specialized Personnel 
Another positive aspect of matrix organizations is that matrixed specialists are 
assigned and reassigned to maximize both their potential and the needs of the projects 
they are assigned to. When a specific task or project is complete, individuals return to 
their functional base where they are available for reassignment accordingly (Davis and 
Lawrence, 1977, p. 17). If, for instance, a specific project is not meeting its program 
baseline due to problems with engineering, the project manager has the flexibility to 
"hire" more engineers to help isolate and correct the problem. When the problem is 
corrected, the "hired" engineer returns to his functional base and is reassigned to another 
task. This sharing of personnel within the organization to meet the diverse technological 
needs of customers saves the organization a great deal of money that would have 
otherwise been spent on permanent salaries. Additionally, matrix personnel have the 
resources and benefits of a large organization from which to draw, yet they retain that 
small-group autonomy that fosters creativity and innovation (Davis and Lawrence, 1977, 
pp. 16-17). The benefit is a focused and resourced professional who is free of the 
bureaucratic politics of a large organization. The organization, on the other hand, retains 
it's economies of scale while encouraging small team independence and innovation. 
Matrix professionals tend to be more mobile and accustomed to moving within 
various jobs. This reduces the amount of time required to "acclimatize" a new employee. 
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3. Adaptability to External Change 
The third benefit of matrix organizations involves flexibility. Initially, many 
projects may be ambiguous in nature. The actual support requirements may not be 
known. This is especially true in high-technology research and developmental areas 
where the design and technologies are still being developed as the project matures (Davis 
and Lawrence, 1977, pp. 14-15) As the project experiences success, the personnel 
requirements may change. Quick deployment of highly-skilled professionals can ensure 
that timelines are maintained, and that the project moves forward at the optimum rate. 
Although the high-technology fields pursue change, organizational change creates 
turbulence that can have a detrimental affect on the productivity of an organization. The 
matrix design is such that new activities can be incorporated or cancelled without a drastic 
structural change. As a project is cancelled, the matrixed individuals are "released" to 
their functional base and reassigned to another project. The end result is less 
organizational turbulence with greater functional flexibility. (Skowronek, 1976, p. 9) 
4. Personal Skills Development 
The final benefit common to matrix structure deals with individual development 
and professional growth. The evolution of a matrix organization causes its employees to 
develop new behavior patterns, new technological skills, and greater interpersonal 
communication abilities (Davis and Lawrence, 1977, p. 107). 
The behavioral pattern of matrix professionals is very open yet non-
confrontational. Most enjoy constantly changing environments as well as personal and 
professional risk. This is driven by the complexity of their job and the uncertainty in 
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their environment. Matrix professionals tend to be more emotionally energetic, self-
starting, and better team players. This, in theory, leads to a greater level of personal 
responsibility and less organizational direction. Employees feel that they have more 
personal freedom and power. The end result is a constantly learning organization that 
shares its knowledge within. (Davis and Lawrence, p. 1 07) 
Most matrix organizations require that their employees return to their functional 
"home" after spending time with a work team at a project location. Within this functional 
home, the latest developmental news is shared among the employees (Davis and 
Lawrence, 1977, pp. 16-17). New technology is spread throughout the group to educate, 
and to ensure that repeated mistakes are avoided. This information sharing (corporate 
memory) keeps all members of the group informed and ready to share their expertise with 
the next project or program they are associated with. (Losi, 1977, p. 5) 
It is important to note that the big difference between personal skills development 
theory and actual practice is training. To assume that an employee can walk into a matrix 
environment (assuming they have spent a considerable amount of time in a functional 
environment) and simply change their behavioral and work patterns, is unrealistic. It is 
essential that prospective matrix personal are thoroughly trained on the workings, 
environment, and stresses associated with this type of organization. Although this 
training comes with a cost, the end result, an aggressive, self-starting, effectively-
communicating professional, is definitely a benefit. (Przemienieki, 1993, pp. 53-57) 
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C. MATRIX WEAKNESSES 
Matrix structure, like any other organizational form, can suffer from a variety of 
pathologies. One of the principal objectives of this research effort was to identify some 
of the more significant weaknesses encountered in matrix organizations, especially as they 
affect the managerial functions of the program manager. Many of these weaknesses may 
occur in more conventional organizations, but the matrixseems particularly vulnerable to 
these ailments. For matrix to _work, managers must become familiar with these common 
weaknesses in order stop them from hurting the organization. Several of these 
weaknesses include authority ambiguity, management conflict/power struggles, worker 
conflict and confusion, communication, and anarchy. 
1. Authority Ambiguity 
One significant weakness present m matrix organizations is the fostering of 
ambiguity in the traditional concept of authority. By definition, matrix structure falls 
half-way between pure functional and pure project structures. Thus, both functional and 
project managers participate in a dual authority relationship at some level in the 
organization. Inherent within the dual authority relationship is a power balance between 
the project management and functional sides. When clear lines of authority are not 
present, authority ambiguity becomes a serious problem. (Losi, 1977, pp. 9-1 0) 
Recipients of the ambiguity of authority condition often include subordinates who 
become affected by an overlap in lines of authority. Research indicates that subordinates 
are often confused as to who has the authority to make crucial decisions concerning a 
project. Unfortunately, subordinates are not the only ones who are confused, as often 
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both the functional and project managers disagree over decision authority. (Losi, 1977, 
pp. 9-10) 
A voiding the ambiguity of authority issue is often as simple as clearly defining, 
m writing, the relationship between the functional and project managers. Other 
organizations which have adopted the matrix structure grant authority based on the type 
of matrix used. In this case, any one of three types of matrix structures are installed: a 
coordination matrix, a balanced matrix, or a project matrix . To illustrate this method, 
the following distinction between administrative tasks is necessary: operational task 
(deciding what project tasks should be done and when), executive task (deciding which 
of the personnel carry out tasks and how), and resource maintenance task (procurement 
and maintenance of departmental resources, both human and material). In a coordination 
matrix, project managers do not obtain any authority. Instead, they assist functional 
managers in coordinating interdepartmental decisions. A balanced matrix represents an 
even balance or compromise between a functional and a product type of organization. 
In this case, project managers get operational authority, while functional managers retain 
executive and maintenance authority. Finally, in a project matrix, project managers obtain 
complete authority regarding project activities, as well as operational and executive 
matters. Under this form, functional managers' involvement is limited to the maintenance 
of departmental resources. (Laat, 1994, pp. 1089-1 090) To succeed in avoiding this 
pathology, senior management within matrix organizations must make determinations 
regarding functional and project managers' authority. Their failure to properly set the 
"ground rules" normally results in an environment of indecision and ambiguity. 
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While the ambiguity of authority weakness is significant, it also serves as a root 
cause for several other weaknesses found in matrix organizations. Perhaps the greatest 
weaknesses caused by this condition are the power struggles and conflicts which occur 
between the functional and project managers. 
2. Management Conflict/Power Struggles 
One weakness common to matrix-based organizations deals with power struggles 
and conflict. As stated earlier, matrix personnel fall under the "two boss" concept. Thus, 
they are subject to the management actions of both their functional and project managers. 
Unfortunately, goals, objectives, concerns, and philosophies are not always shared 
between these individuals. When there is disagreement with any of these areas, conflict 
occurs. (Przemienieki, 1993, pp. 53-57) As a simple example, consider a department 
manager who schedules functional department meetings each Friday in order to share the 
latest technical information found in any of the corporation's on-going projects. The 
meetings generally last the entire day, and are the source of excellent information sharing 
among the personnel in the department. However, on the project side of the house, the 
project manager of a multi-million dollar project that is behind schedule needs the same 
individuals working on project-related material throughout the entire week, including 
Fridays. All the prerequisites are in place for a classic power struggle to occur between 
the two respective managers. If the two managers are unable to agree on the 
organization's goals, conflict ensues. 
32 
Authority over manpower represents just one example of the conflict that can exist 
within matrix organizations. Other items which give particular rise to conflict generation 
include: 
1. Conflict over schedules 
2. Conflict over priorities within the project 
3. Conflict over technical issues 
4. Conflict over administration 
5. Conflict of personality 
6. Conflict over costs (Losi, 1977, p. 12) 
Interestingly enough, another source of managerial conflict occurs during the introduction 
· of matrix into an existing organization. In this case, functional managers find their 
authority further reduced, as authority now comes both from above their functional 
departments, and from project managers located laterally across their departments (Laat, 
1994, p. 1 090). This condition often equates to a loss of authority on behalf of 
functional managers and is exacerbated by a divergence in viewpoints on behalf of 
everyone involved. While the project manager is responsible for meeting project goals 
within a specified time-span and budget, functional managers are concerned that their 
departmental resources, human as well as material, are used effectively and are kept in 
good condition. In this case, "turf war" conflict becomes a force of will as all parties 
attempt to achieve their goals. (Laat, 1994, pp. 1089-1090) 
Unfortunately, conflict-based "turf wars" can occur in any matrix organization, 
regardless if they are internally or externally based. Organizations in which functional 
and project managers are able to build both a professional and personal rapport with one 
another are less likely to experience power struggles and conflict (Davis and Lawrence, 
1977, pp.106-107). In these circumstances, the managers on both sides are able to place 
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the needs of the corporation over the needs of their respective domains. Hence, they are 
willing to cooperate and mutually identify priorities within their areas for the benefit of 
the corporation. With this shared vision and the corporation's best interest in mind, the 
functional manager, in the conflict of personnel example mentioned earlier, would readily 
make exceptions to the attendance of the members working on the project that was behind 
schedule. With cooperation between managers, matrix organizations can overcome this 
common structural pathology. 
3. Worker Conflict and Confusion 
Closely related to the management conflict pathology is another weakness defined 
as worker conflict and confusion. This common pathology with matrix organizations deals 
with the dual authority structure. While this "two boss" syndrome is closely tied to the 
pathology of managerial conflict and power struggles described earlier, it entails a change 
in perspective. By definition, the conflict and confusion pathology involves the matrix 
workers, and not the managers. 
Under matrix structure, individual workers normally "belong" to their functional 
department for administrative and personnel purposes (Davis and Lawrence, 1977, p. 8). 
This arrangement dictates that the functional manager, not the project manager, conducts 
performance ratings on personnel in the organization. Thus, even though an individual 
worker has been assigned to a project for the past year, and is based across the country 
from his functional home, the functional manager retains the right to evaluate the worker's 
performance. This situation is not uncommon among both industry and DoD matrix-based 
organizations, and creates a climate of dissatisfaction among matrix workers. Workers 
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who are involved in a project believe that regardless of the quality of their work, other 
workers involved in performing tasks at their functional base's home station will be given 
preferable treatment on performance evaluations. This "out of sight, out of mind" 
environment common to matrix organizations contributes to the conflict and confusion 
pathology. (Matthews, 1995) 
Further expanding upon the conflict and confusion pathology, matrix workers can 
easily find themselves involved in the management power struggle pathology described 
earlier. Under many conditions, the power struggle between the functional and project 
managers can and does flow down to individuals located within both the functional and 
project offices (Davis and Lawrence, 1977, pp. 129-130). In extreme cases, the conflict 
can be so intense that matrix personnel are confused as to whether or not to follow the 
instructions given by the project manager because he is· in direct confrontation with their 
functional manager. In the end, matrix workers side with the individual manager who 
writes their evaluations - the functional manager. Under these conditions, project 
managers may feel that they have little to no control over their matrix personnel. 
Although this situation represents a severe case, one can b~gin to understand how 
matrix personnel are affected by the "two boss" matrix structure. If the organization is 
not managed correctly, matrix personnel find themselves in a climate of inequality and 
confusion. 
4. Communi£ation 
Communication is extremely important in any organization and probably more so 
in a matrix. As previously discussed, matrix organizations are unlike the more traditional 
35 
hierarchial organizations. In fact, it can be argued that they are inherently more complex. 
It is this complexity that adds a new dimension to communication within the matrix 
organization. 
Throughout the research conducted on matrix organizations, the communication 
pathology was continuously mentioned in relation to other topics such as management 
conflict or power struggles. This literature states that communication is much more 
complex and difficult in a matrix structure than in a traditional organization. One of the 
main challenges to effective communication often addressed is the different and "new" 
structure. The interdependencies of a matrix simply require increased communication . 
. However, this increased communication creates new problems. For example, in a 
functional organization, roles are structured so that the individuals can ·usually resolve 
conflicting demands by talking to their own functional boss. In a matrix, these 
differences are resolved with people from different functions who often have very 
different perspectives. (Losi, 1977, pp. 14-15) 
Another issue that is repeatedly mentioned in the literature involves the constant 
changing of teams and team members. The changing nature of work in matrix 
organizations causes teams to be continuously disbanded. Because new teams are always 
forming, lateral and vertical communication must be continually stressed. Communication 
often starts off poorly and over time, becomes more effective. New members, or entire 
new teams, must learn the norms of communication within their new organization. Often 
these norms are informal, making the transition even more difficult. (Davis and 
Lawrence, 1977, pp. 129-132) 
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Ineffective informal communications represents another concern inherent to the 
communications pathology. While formal communication is extremely important to 
organizational success, informal communication within an organization is absolutely 
critical for effective day-to-day operations. After all, informal communication serves as 
the most basic form of lateral coordination. Informal communication channels cannot 
become effective overnight. They often take months, even years, to develop in an 
organization. Because personnel change frequently in matrix organizations, the 
effectiveness of informal communications may take longer to mature. In addition, new 
personnel must learn the informal ways each time they come aboard. 
Another possible reason why poor communications exist within matrix 
organizations is the presence of an increased number of managerial layers. While this 
condition is inherent to matrix structure, it ts virtually non-existent m traditional 
hierarchial organizations. These layers, or lines of authority, make lateral communication 
difficult, if not impossible. Additionally, the physical distance that separates DoD matrix 
personnel from their functional base, compounds lateral communication problems. To 
alleviate this, successful matrix personnel have been able to balance the need for lateral 
communication between their project and their functional base. (Losi, 1977, p. 15) 
To deal with this ever-changing communication environment, managers and 
operating personnel have to be educated and trained to work in this area. New technology 
such as E-Mail and electronic data bases have made communication easier. However, 
new technology alone cannot solve all the problems. New techniques need to be 
developed to handle the complex communication problems of matrix organizations. 
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Managers and technical personnel will require additional knowledge and skills as well as 
modified attitudes if they are to communicate effectively in these new, sophisticated 
organizations. 
5. Anarchy 
One problem that occasionally occurs in organizations that have adopted a matrix 
form is anarchy. Anarchy is best defined as people's reluctance to fully inculcate the 
structure of the new organization (in this case the matrix) by formally defining that 
structure so that it can be effectively used. As organizational structures change, people 
have a tendency to fear the "unknown" and feel threatened by the new structure as it is 
presented. No clearly-defined organizational structure is emplaced. The end result is a 
freeform type of organizational structure that is somewhere between the old structure and 
a true matrix. This is often referred to as a latent matrix. Clearly-defined roles and lines 
of communication are not developed for use within the new matrix organization. (Davis 
and Lawrence, 1977, pp. 131-133) 
This lack of organizational structure 1s very taxing on the internal lateral 
communications of the organization. As the organization matures, communication 
becomes even more difficult. For example, suppose a manager were given the 
responsibility to complete a task that required coordination with various departments 
within the company. There are however, no formal agreements or systems in place to 
help the manager accomplish his task. He has to cross functional lines of authority to try 
and get resources necessary to meet the company's objectives. As communications 
weaken, production and sales figures begin to drop. The manager, now fully frustrated, 
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tries to push harder on the functional departments to meet his needs. The end result is 
basic employee anarchy: the manager fails. Additionally, when this type of situation 
occurs, the immediate response is that the matrix is ineffective. Often the end result of 
the previous example is complete abandonment of matrix organization as a viable form 
of management. (Davis and Lawrence, 1977, pp. 131-133) 
Research indicates that proper human resource planning is critical to preventing 
a situation that leads to anarchy (Davis and Lawrence, 1977, pp. 131-133). The matrix 
organization requires managers who think differently from functional or project 
management. Because of this, matrix management almost needs to be "grown" within the 
organization. There is a certain culture that is developed within a functional environment. 
Over time, this culture becomes essentially internalized into the group's way of life. 
Changing that group culture will have a serious effect on the organization (Bolman and 
Deal, 1991, p. 103). Managers who spend a considerable. amount of time in the 
functional arena have serious difficulty adapting to the matrix mentality (two-bosses, 
decentralized control). Unfortunately, growing your own management sometimes restricts 
innovation and prevents fresh ideas from entering the organization. Additionally, it takes 
a considerable amount of time to groom skilled managers who may be needed 
immediately (Davis and Lawrence, 1977, pp. 116-117). 
6. Other Areas 
The problem areas described earlier (authority ambiguity, management 
conflict/power struggles, worker conflict and confusion, communication, and anarchy) are 
significant areas of concern . to managers operating within a matrix organization. 
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However, this list is by no means exhaustive. Other areas of significance are cited by 
various researchers. These include the following: 
1. Anxiety by project personnel over loss of employment as projects near 
completion. 
2. Lack of career development afforded to project specialists. 
3. Low sense of loyalty from project assigned personnel due to the perception 
of a transient state. 
4. Over-specialization of personnel who are collocated (inability to share in 
home/office experience and development). 
5. The matrix form of organization fosters an increase in the number of 
management levels. (Losi, 1977, pp.19-20) 
6. Matrix results in a complex managerial structure (Losi, 1977, pp. 19-20) 
While matrix structure has many pathologies, it is assumed that the disadvantages of the 
matrix organization are outweighed by the benefits of efficiency and increased 
productivity. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has introduced and discussed several strengths and weaknesses of 
the matrix structure. The strengths of matrix structure included 1) management of dual 
environmental demands, 2) flexible use of specialized personnel, 3) flexibility to external 
change, and 4) personal skills development. Matrix pathologies discussed in the chapter 
included 1) authority ambiguity, 2) management conflict/power struggles, 3) worker 
conflict and confusion, 4) communication, and 5) anarchy. Several of the matrix 
pathologies involved discussions of preventative measures which are available to reduce 
an organization's probability of encountering the possible weakness. Successful 
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management m a matrix environment is based on the awareness of the merits and 
drawbacks of the organizational form. Matrix was conceived with the intent of being able 
to manage in a high priority, technically demanding and rapidly changing program 
environment. If the matrix structure is to survive and meet these challenges, managers 
must determine the best ways to take advantage of its strengths while, simultaneously, 
eliminating or reducing the effects of its weaknesses. 
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IV. MATRIX STRUCTURE IN ARMY ACQllSITION PROGRAM 
OFFICES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
While Chapter III discussed many of the published strengths and weaknesses of 
general matrix structure, Chapter IV narrows the focus, and introduces the observed 
strengths and weaknesses of the matrix structure within Army acquisition program offices. 
This chapter also discusses how program managers throughout the Army have attempted 
to maximize the attributes of matrix, while simultaneously finding ways of minimizing 
its weaknesses. The intent of this chapter is to formally document the knowledge and 
experiences offered by program managers in order to draw some conclusions with respect 
to optimizing an organizational structure which is likely to remain the way the Army 
manages acquisition in the foreseeable future. 
B. DEMOGRAPHICS 
In order to obtain a true cross-section of ideas, experiences, and opinions, I 
conducted interviews with 18 program and major subordinate command (MSC) managers. 
Program manager input came from within the following Program Executive Offices: 
Armored Systems Modernization, Aviation, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare, Tactical 
Missiles, Tactical Wheeled Vehicles, and Cruise Missiles Project and Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles Joint Project. Major subordinate command input was provided from within the 
Missile Command (MICOM). The PMs who were interviewed had an average of ten 
years in program offices, and an average of five and a half years of matrix experience. 
The mixture of personnel chosen was based upon a desire by the researcher to include 
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both the supporting and supported organizations within the matrix structure. The general 
comments and information provided throughout this chapter represent data gathered from 
both the functional and program sides in order to allow the reader to develop his own 
conclusions regarding the published information. 
C. OBSERVED MATRIX STRENGTHS 
Program managers and MSC managers did not hesitate to point out the strengths 
offered by the matrix structure. While many of the PMs' and MSC managers' opinions 
agree with the published literature on matrix strengths, many of the comments are unique 
to the Army program office environment. This situation is to be expected, as established 
matrix structure often varies from organization to organization. In general, the interview 
process revealed two broad categories of strengths offered by the matrix structure. These 
categories are flexibility and increased access to knowledge. 
1. Flexibility 
One hundred percent of the program managers interviewed included flexibility as 
the matrix structure's greatest strength. Regardless of the individual's opinion of the 
overall success of the matrix structure, none could argue with the advantages offered 
under this particular strength. The ability to quickly add, replace, or delete personnel 
from a program in an expeditious manner provides the program manager with an 
extremely beneficial attribute. While this attribute may suggest that program managers 
are in a constant state of adding or deleting personnel from their programs, this is simply 
not the case. The Army's current organization dictates that program managers and major 
subordinate commands establish Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) each year. These 
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MOAs establish requirements for personnel support needed by the program offices. Based 
upon the total number of programs supported by each individual MSC, personnel within 
the command are shifted and organized as necessary from within their functional base in 
order to support the program offices. The MOA procedure helps the MSCs make 
personnel decisions regarding the support they should provide to the project offices. 
However, each MSC realizes that project offices can add or release individuals as 
necessary during the year in order to react to unforeseen changes in funding, technological 
issues, or program direction. To assist the MSCs in this process, many PMs choose to 
include options in the MOAs which can be activated based upon certain sets of 
circumstances. (PM/MSC manager, 1996) This procedure is normally done when the PM 
is uncertain about the upcoming year's requirements. 
Personnel changes are requested by PMs for numerous reasons. First, changes in 
the program scope may require skill changes. This is often the case when programs move 
through a milestone decision into the program's next phase. For instance, projects 
entering into the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase from the 
Demonstration and Validation (DEMV AL) phase often create a need for more production 
engineers and testers as opposed to design engineers. Matrix structure allows the PM to 
transition the necessary personnel (add and delete) from their functional organization 
based on his request to the appropriate MSC. If project offices were structured under a 
conventional project structure, personnel would have to be released and hired in order to 
achieve the same result. 
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Another reason why PMs request personnel changes is due to dissatisfaction with 
the performance of an individual matrix worker. In this situation, the matrix worker 
either lacks the sufficient background, education, or desire to accomplish a task. Program 
managers are able to simply notify the major subordinate command that the individual 
worker is not producing up to a desired level, and the individual is replaced. Program 
managers who do not receive an immediate response from the MSC, may simply stop 
paying the individual's salary until he is replaced. While this set of circumstances is rare, 
it is an effective way to get the MSC's attention. (PMIMSC manager, 1996) 
Unfortunately, changes in personnel are not always dictated by the program 
manager. Each MSC has the ability to remove and replace personnel serving under a 
project as well. This is done by the functional office when they believe the individual 
matrix worker needs to gain experience elsewhere as part of a promotion effort, or when 
the individual has been determined to be next in line for additional education or training. 
Under these circumstances, every program manager interviewed understood the need for 
replacement. In the words of one PM, 11 ••• when a replacement is done for experience 
reasons, or for promotion reasons, you just cannot turn that down as you are dealing with 
someone's career at that point. 11 (PM, 1996) The problem with replacements is twofold. 
First, many program managers feel that the MSCs do not always replace matrix personnel 
based upon their career progression. Instead, many of the program managers interviewed 
felt that they received replacements simply because the MSC needed to find a position 
for a subcaliber person, or when another project needed the benefit of a certain talent. 
46 
In the end, the first project office receives a subcaliber person while another program 
supported by the MSC benefits from the exchange. 
The second problem with replacements involves training. While the matrix 
structure allows program managers the flexibility to replace current workers, the time 
involved with bringing a new member of the office up to speed on the current status of 
the project is often measured on a scale of months instead of hours or days. While this 
situation is often accepted as one of the costs associated with the professional 
advancement of a former employee, it becomes an unacceptable cost when an individual 
is replaced for other than professional reasons. If the second case is allowed to occur, 
-animosity between the PM and the MSC is the inevitable result. 
2. Increased Access to Knowledge 
The second strength of matrix structure involves the increased access to 
knowledge. When a matrix worker enters a program office, he does so knowing that he 
has access to large amounts of experience and knowledge from his peers who remain at 
the functional base. The benefit of this condition is that it allows individuals with limited 
expertise to be able to draw on experience from within their functional area to help them 
get over the hurdles which they do not have the necessary expertise to do themselves. 
While this strength seems to be extremely efficient and attractive, it must be put 
it into perspective. First, this strength mainly benefits smaller project or product offices 
as opposed to larger program offices. The rationale for this statement is relatively simple. 
First, smaller project or product offices receive less funding, making the number of both 
core and matrix support personnel smaller than that of larger program offices. Thus, 
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instead of having the luxury of 20- 25 design engineers, a product office may contain as 
few as two. Fortunately for the product office, these two engineers have the ability to 
remain in close contact with their functional organization. This attribute allows them to 
draw from the experiences and education of many engineers, thereby increasing their 
knowledge base to levels similar in number to those employed by a larger program office. 
In the end, two engineers give a product office a level of knowledge which is comparable 
to an office consisting of many engineers. (PMs, 1996) 
While this strength is noted for assisting smaller project and product offices, does 
it assist the larger project and program offices as well? Based upon interviews, the 
answer to this question is no. While matrix personnel located within larger program 
offices have the same ability to draw from the functional command as do their 
counterparts in smaller project and product offices, the need to do so is reduced based on 
the sheer numbers and levels of expertise available from matrix workers within the 
program office itself. Thus, while this strength allows smaller project and product offices 
to have increased access to talent that they would not normally be able to obtain, it does 
not automatically benefit the larger programs. (PMs, 1996) 
D. OBSERVED MATRIX WEAKNESSES 
While program managers and MSC managers were quick to point out the strengths 
of the matrix structure within Army acquisition program offices, each was equally willing 
to express his opinion on matrix weaknesses. As alluded to in Chapter III, it is 
impossible to find an organizational structure which is without fault, and the matrix 
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structure is no exception. The major weaknesses which the program managers identified 
fall into two broad categories: worker loyalty and worker selectivity. 
1. Worker Loyalty 
The worker loyalty category, which was identified by program managers as being 
a matrix weakness, actually consists of numerous facets. While many of the issues raised 
under this category are common to matrix organizations everywhere, several are only 
applicable to Army program offices. The facets which I will focus on include worker 
motivation and allegiance, and performance ratings and awards. 
The first weakness identified by PMs involves worker motivation and allegiance. 
Prior to the introduction of matrix structure into Army, project offices were very large. 
The size alone allowed each project office to be completely self-contained with respect 
to the personnel needed to complete its tasks. During this period, there was no doubt 
where employees owed their allegiance to: the project office. With the introduction of 
matrix, this concept changed. Employees now became responsible to their functional 
office as well as their project office. It was at this point that the issue of allegiance 
surfaced. Who should the employee show his allegiance to? The .answer to this question 
is not as obvious as it may seem, as employee allegiance is based upon a selected set of 
criteria. These criteria include the employee's physical working location and performance 
evaluation scheme. (PMs, 1996) 
Matrix workers assigned to MSCs may support a program in one of two ways. 
First, a particular employee may be collocated with the project office. Under this set of 
circumstances, the program manager solicits the MSC to have the employee collocated 
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with the project office because the program is "employing" (and funding) the individual 
on a full-time basis. This type of matrix employee leaves his functional base, and works 
in the project office for as long as the program continues to fund him. The other possible 
support alternative available to program managers is non-collocated matrix. Under this 
scenario, the individual matrix worker provides some level of support (ranging from part-
time to full-time) to the program manager, but does so from his functional base. This 
scenario is often used when the project office does not have the necessary office space 
available for the worker or does not require the worker's services for an entire year. 
Where does this leave the question of loyalty? Most of the program managers 
interviewed agreed that the answer to this question is largely personality-driven. 
However, according to one program manager, the difference is clear, " ... there is a 
discernible difference between the level of responsiveness displayed by collocated matrix 
and non-collocated matrix personnel." (PM, 1996) Another program manager added, 
" ... with collocation, the individual's loyalty lies with the PM shop. If they are not 
collocated, then their loyalties are diverse." (PM, 1996) 
Perhaps the greatest reason why a significant loyalty issue exists between 
collocated and non-collocated matrix personnel, or between core and matrix personnel in 
general, is the performance evaluation and award scheme. As addressed in Chapter II, 
AR 70-1 and AAE Policy Memorandum 91-4 each require rating input from the PM. 
However, this policy has not been universally implemented. Thus, some of the PMs 
interviewed have yet to receive authority to rate matrix personnel within their program 
offices. This situation has implications on the loyalty issue discussed earlier. As stated 
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by one PM, 11 .. .if the personnel are core, you rate them, and thus there are clear lines of 
delineation as to where their loyalties lie ... with matrix personnel, there is no such 
guarantee. 11 (PM, 1996) While some of the PMs and MSC managers downplayed the 
importance of PM input to performance evaluations on matrix workers, elaborating instead 
on how their matrix personnel are motivated to perform based upon their allegiance to the 
product, every PM agreed that involvement in the rating scheme is important. As one PM 
stated, 11 •• .involvement in the rating scheme is important because it can enhance worker 
performance at times. 11 (PM, 1996) 
The current award system, like the performance evaluation system, differs between 
MSCs. As such, PM comments regarding the award system tended to vary. However, 
one point (and subsequent weakness) was clear. This point involves the policy regarding 
the amount of an award which can be made to an individual matrix employee. Major 
subordinate commands normally develop a policy regarding the monetary amount of 
award individuals may receive. The policy states that the total of monetary awards given 
during a fiscal year may not exceed 1.5% of the total salary of everyone assigned to the 
functional organization. Thus, while PMs have input regarding the amount of award they 
believe a matrix worker should receive, the functional command makes the final decision. 
This decision often results in a lower dollar amount than the PM requested. (PM/MSC 
manager, 1996) In the end, matrix workers who spend an entire year working within a 
program office are subject to the award policies and approval chain dictated by their 
functional organization. 
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2. Worker Selectivity 
The second broad category of identified weaknesses involves worker selectivity. 
Like the worker loyalty category discussed earlier, worker selectivity consists of many 
facets. However, the common thread which binds these facets together is the inability of 
the PM to have complete control in determining which matrix worker he is provided. 
Under project organizations, program managers have the ability to hire new 
workers as required to support their program. While this process may take time, the PM 
is eventually able to hire the person whom he feels can best fill a position. In contrast, 
the matrix structure may not allow the PM to be selective regarding his matrix staff. 
Instead, the PM is forced to initially accept everyone that the MSC sends him; replacing 
subcaliber performers over time. As one PM stated, " ... the bad part is that you have less 
selectivity over who you get, and the quality of those personnel vary from average to 
good to superb." (PM, 1996) 
Closely tied to this issue is the replacement of matrix personnel by the MSCs. As 
mentioned earlier, MSCs have the ability to replace personnel working in project offices 
at any time. While a replacement action is normally executed when a particular worker 
is approaching promotion, or when the worker is slated to obtain further education, this 
is not always the case. Unfortunately, PMs often find that MSCs replace their matrix 
workers in order to find a position for a subcaliber person, or because another project is 
in need of a certain talent. When either of these situations occur, the minimum damage 
encountered by the first project office involves the re-training of another worker. 
(PM/MSC manager, 1996) 
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The third weakness identified under the worker selectivity category involves 
barriers in accessing matrix workers from other MSCs. Army PEOs throughout the 
country receive their primary matrix support from a geographically close, and 
functionally-related, MSC. For instance, Program Executive Officer Tactical Missiles 
receives the majority of their matrix support from the U.S. Army Missile Command 
(MICOM), while Program Executive Officer Armored Systems Modernization receives 
the majority of their matrix support from Army Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM). 
Occasionally, PMs require a special form of expertise to assist their project. If the 
expertise is more abundant in a MSC which is not the primary supporter of the PM's 
PEO, the PM often encounters difficulty in obtaining it. As one PM stated, " ... one 
weakness involves the relative inability to go to other commands that are more talented 
and can better meet my demands .. .it is painful at times as the attempts are resisted by the 
local MSC who wants to employ their own personnel." (PM, 1996) As another PM 
stated, " ... we should have the flexibility to go to the source of the most expertise." (PM, 
1996) 
The resistance offered by the local MSC is both unfortunate and understandable. 
With the reduction of both personnel and available funds throughout the Department of 
Defense, MSCs are pressured to find employment for an increasingly larger number of 
personnel whom they can no longer hide within the command's overhead costs. In the 
end, MSCs "market" and "sell" a percentage of their personnel to the supported projects 
in order to avoid Governmental reductions-in-force. (PM/MSC manager, 1996) 
The final worker selectivity weakness identified by PMs involves a growing lack 
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of competent technical personnel. In other words, some of the PMs interviewed felt that 
the MSCs were falling behind in developing the personnel needed to deal with the 
growing number of complex systems. As the PM of an extremely complex project stated, 
" ... there is such a lack of technical competence that I have to rely on the pnme 
(contractor) to tell me the truth as I have no one to tell me otherwise." (PM, 1996) 
Unfortunately, this situation is not likely to get any better. Until the current Government 
civilian hiring and promotion freeze ends, PMs will continue to face this predicament. 
As one PM stated, " .. .in the future, since we are neither hiring nor promoting, I feel that 
we will end up contracting out for all of this support ... because the matrix will not be 
able to provide it." (PM, 1996) 
The two major weakness areas identified by the PMs and MSC managers represent 
problem areas which must be addressed and minimized if the matrix structure is to· be 
optimized in the future. While one of the problems identified by PMs requires 
Congressional action to cure (hiring and promotion freeze), others simply require quality 
leadership to make the system perform. The final section within this chapter addresses 
some of the ways which PMs and MSC managers have attempted to optimize the matrix 
structure. 
E. MAXIMIZING THE MATRIX STRUCTURE 
Pointing out the problems associated with the matrix structure is only half the 
battle. The other half involves making the structure work, and work successfully. 
Contrary to basic human intuition, the fact that this two-manager structure even works at 
all is not due to some kind .of divine intervention. Instead, it is more an issue of 
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leadership, cultural change, and personnel management. The implementation of these 
traits and beliefs have evolved the matrix structure into one which, while admittedly 
unpopular, can be effective. Here are some of the possible methods and organizational 
variants which PMs believe can (or already have) been used to improve or optimize the 
matrix structure as an effective form of organization within their project offices. 
1. Collocation 
Perhaps one of the biggest differences in the level of support provided by matrix 
workers involves the issue of collocation. As stated earlier, matrix employees can support 
the program office in one of three ways. First, the individual can physically work in the 
program office (often referred to as direct support). Next, he may support the project on 
a full-time basis, but work in his functional office instead. This is done in cases where 
the project office does not have the office space for the individual, or when the individual 
requires the extensive use of technical facilities which are only available at his functional 
base. The third way which matrix employees support a project is on a part-time basis 
(often referred to as general support). In this case, the individual works for, and is funded 
by, the project office for one-half or one-quarter of a man-year. Due to the part time 
nature of this situation, the matrix worker usually works at his functional base. 
Each of the PMs interviewed during the course of this research believed that there 
is a significant difference between the level of support received from a collocated matrix 
worker verses that of a non-collocated one. As one PM stated, " ... the worst case scenario 
is when your matrix personnel are not collocated, and you have no control over whether 
things are being accomplished at all ... while the PM is still responsible, he has no clout 
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in getting things done." (PM, 1996) However, when matrix employees are collocated, 
PMs were quick to point out the difference, " ... collocation is absolutely key and 
essential...we have both collocated and non-collocated matrix support, and I treat the 
collocated as essentially part of my core." (PM, 1996) The rationale for this belief is 
essentially simple. First of all, collocation enables matrix workers to work side-by-side 
with core personnel on a daily basis. Displaced from their functional base, matrix 
workers begin to take on the character of the project office. Over time, the rapid pace 
and teaming aspect associated with the project office begins to make matrix workers adopt 
a more project oriented identity. As one program manager stated, " ... this creates 
environments of loyalty and this makes a big difference in the way people think about 
themselves and the program ... the sense of belonging is important." (PM, 1996) 
Can collocation help resolve the loyalty weakness pointed out earlier? According 
to one PM, it can: "One key item is collocation ... with collocation, the individual worker's 
loyalty lies with the program office, while if they are not collocated, their loyalties 
become diverse." (PM, 1996) As another PM stated, " .. .I believe that when collocated 
matrix workers enter the office, they become part of the team and are willing to put out 
as much effort as core folks are." (PM, 1996) Based on these comments, PMs have found 
that by collocating matrix employees, the loyalty weaknesses identified earlier become 
much less intrusive. 
While collocation is certainly one way which PMs have used to maximize matrix 
worker efficiency and gain loyalty, how do we address the problems associated with non-
collocation? For instance, how do PMs know whether they are getting their money's 
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worth with from their non-collocated personnel? As one PM stated, " .. .I never know 
whether I am truly getting my money's worth from this person or whether he is just 
providing me enough work to keep me from getting on his back." (PM, 1996) According 
to one PM, the best way to reduce the effects of this situation is through a review process. 
In effect, " ... the way to assist in the process of ensuring you are getting what you are 
paying for is to have quarterly review sessions and reports where the functional office 
must report how the full-time support personnel account for their hours." (PMIMSC 
manager, 1996) These reviews force the functional office to account for the actions of 
their support personnel. Unfortunately, while these reviews allow the PM to gain an 
understanding of what was accomplished over the quarter, it does not provide a full 
accounting for the expenditure of funding. According to one PM, " ... this represents a 
major flaw in the way we do business, in terms of accounting on how time and resources 
are spent." (PM, 1996) Until program offices and MSCs can develop an answer to this 
dilemma, we will continue to condone a flaw " ... which would never be accepted in our 
personal life or in commercial industry." (PM/MSC manager, 1996) 
According to a recent Army Headquarters PMO Review Team investigation of the 
Army's weapon systems PEOs, business planning is already helping to maximize the value 
of resources expended in the matrix support arena. The team's report stated that PEO 
aviation has been in the forefront of this effort with the development of a model and 
supporting automated system designed to properly forecast and identify required resources, 
define matrix support requirements, and document the information for the planning, 
programming, budgeting, and execution of system needs. Unfortunately, the report 
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concedes that this model is confined to the short term, leaving a long term solution to the 
standardization of PEO structures throughout the Army. The standardization of PEO 
structures is designed to significantly enhance the MSC's ability to provide adequate 
matrix support to the PEO community. In theory, this solution is designed to stabilize 
required skill mixes for matrix support personnel, allowing MSCs to more efficiently 
forecast required resources. While standardization provides one possible answer, it is a 
solution with many opponents. (PMs, 1996) This opposition is led by PMs and PEOs 
who believe that no two projects are alike. By standardizing PM offices within PEOs, 
the loss in flexibility will negate any positive aspects of standardization (PMIMSC 
manager, 1996). While this issue is certainly one which will either help or hurt matrix 
support in the future, it remains undecided to date. 
2. Customer Focus and the Effect of Teaming 
One of the greatest innovations designed to maximize the matrix structure involves 
the concepts of customer focus and teaming. As addressed earlier, major subordinate 
commands are responsible for providing personnel and technical support to PEOs within 
the Army. In the mid to late 1980's, both the MSCs and PEOs had enough funding to 
pursue their individual interests without having to rely heavily upon each other for 
survival. With the shrinking of the defense budget and subsequent reductions in both 
military and civilian personnel, this era of independence came to an end. In order for 
MSCs to survive today, they must receive and fulfill support requests demanded by PMs 
and PEOs. While this situation represents a change from the past, MSCs which are 
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successful at providing the required support are able to maintain greater levels of 
employees; all else remaining equal. 
The ability to not only provide support, but concurrently maintain a customer 
focus, is the difference between a matrix structure which merely works and a matrix 
structure which works effectively. The Army Materiel Command (AMC) took the lead 
in developing a way for PMs and PEOs to have a voice regarding how well they were 
supported. With the implementation of Quarterly Evaluation Reports (QER), PMs and 
PEOs now rate divisions within each MSC. These ratings are passed to the AMC 
commander via each MSC commander. In this way, both the AMC commander and his 
various MSC managers are able to evaluate the support they provide based upon PM and 
PEO input. Has this type of evaluation been effective? The overwhelming. answer to this 
question has been yes. As one PM stated, " ... divisions within MSCs have immediately 
responded to poor ratings by putting in inquiries as to why they received what they did." 
(PM, 1996) Still another PM stated, " ... the labs and organizations (MSCs) send out 
surveys which they take very seriously .. .if there is a low rating, they immediately come 
to the office and ask us what they can do better." (PM, 1996) The end result of the QER 
system is summarized best by one particular PM who stated, " ... the overall result of this 
has been an increasingly more customer-oriented functional organization which is more 
responsive to the PM office because they know that the input is being fed directly to the 
commanding general." (PM, 1996) 
While the QER system has assisted in instilling a more customer-oriented mindset 
on behalf of many MSCs, it is not the only reason. Many MSCs did not need to be 
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involved in the QER system in order to see the writing on the wall. The message was 
delivered instead by a reduction in functional budgets and personnel. As one PM stated, 
" ... many of matrix's problems are going away with the customer satisfaction initiative by 
MSCs and the current downsizing initiatives." (PM, 1996) With the shrinking budgets, 
MSCs have realized that they cannot maintain their positions without the financial support 
provided to them by the PEOs. As one PM stated, " ... many organizations which provide 
matrix personnel support have realized that their bread and butter lies with the quality of 
support provided to the project offices .. .failure to meet the requirements set out by the PM 
results in reduced incomes, and a reduced labor force." (PM, 1996) Thus, the effect of 
the shrinking budget has made MSCs realize that supporting the PM is now a top priority 
instead of a nuisance. In the words of one official, " ... customer focus is one of our strong 
points, we have learned that we have to pay attention to the customer and remember that 
he is a paying customer." (MSC manager, 1996) If the MSCs do not see the writing on 
the wall, the result will be clear. As one MSC manager stated, " .. .if we are not giving 
that customer a quality product in a timely fashion, then he has the opportunity to go 
elsewhere to buy it (support contractor or other MSC)." (MSC manager, 1996) 
Closely related to the concept of customer focus is the spirit of teaming. Teaming 
consists of a dedication or reliance on the inputs and outputs of two entities which are 
designed to promote the overall good of both. The current environment of teaming and 
collaboration on behalf of many the PMs and MSCs have assisted in adding efficiency 
to the matrix structure. As one PM stated, "it is not the PM and the functional, it is both 
working this thing together as a team." (PM, 1996) A MSC manager put it just as well 
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by stating. " ... you must work at it (matrix structure) to make it work .. .it has got to be a 
mutual and agreed upon thing between the PM and the MSC in order to exercise it to 
everyone's best mutual benefit." (MSC manager, 1996) Without the ability for each side 
to recognize his position and duties within the matrix configuration, neither side will 
succeed. In other words, matrix structure is only as strong as its weakest link. For matrix 
to be effective, the relationships between the functional and project offices must be based 
upon open and trusting collaboration instead of animosity. In effect, the supporting and 
supported entities work together in order to achieve outcomes that neither could realize 
by working independently. 
3. The Rating Game 
One policy which PMs universally agree must be enforced involves the 
performance evaluation guidance as outlined in AR 70-1. As stated in Chapter II, the 
PEO or PM must have the ability to influence the performance evaluations of his matrix 
support personnel. The regulation specifically calls for the PM or PEO to be the 
reviewing official for civilian performance appraisals. However, this policy is yet to be 
universally implemented. The overall effect of not allowing the PM to be involved in the 
rating chain is the inability of the PM to influence worker performance when worker 
loyalty and dedication is clearly oriented toward the. worker's functional base. When this 
situation occurs, the program office's effectiveness and efficiency are likely to suffer as 
decisions made by the PM can be "blackballed" by matrix workers who are not subject 
to any form of retribution. As one PM stated, " .. .if the PM is not in the rating scheme, 
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he does not have control over what is happening in the organization in terms of his 
personnel." (PM, 1996) 
While the guidance set out in AR 70-1 has not been implemented by several 
PEOs, others have worked out arrangements with their supporting MSCs, allowing them 
to be involved with matrix personnel evaluations. Under some situations, MSCs have 
worked out rating arrangements under the customer focus initiatives discussed earlier. In 
effect, the MSCs negotiate personnel evaluation schemes with PMs as part of the annual 
MOA. The end result of this initiative includes satisfied PMs who feel they now have 
a say in their employees' careers. While success stories do exist, the failure of PEOs and 
MSCs to universally implement the guidance dictated in AR 70-1 has led to impediments 
of the initiatives designed to enhance the overall performance of the matrix structure. 
4. Leadership 
One way in which PMs attempt to optimize or improve the matrix structure is 
through quality leadership. In this context, leadership is differentiated into two different 
categories: leadership and its role in the development of binding relationships between 
MSC managers and PEOs; and leadership combined with interpersonal skills which PMs 
must implement at the program level. The first category, leadership's role in the 
development of binding relationships between MSC managers and PEOs, is closely related 
to the customer focus initiatives instituted by many MSCs. However, the role in which 
leadership plays in this relationship deserves further analysis. According to many of the 
PMs interviewed, the relationship between individual PMs and the supporting commands 
is critical with respect to the quality of support provided. Where should this relationship 
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begin? According to one PM, " ... the relationship can, and should be set at the PEO level, 
and the quality of support provided is due largely to the relationship between the 
supported and supporting commands." (PM, 1996) This belief was echoed during the 
Headquarters PMO Review Team's findings as well. The team stated, " .. .it is our position 
that the matrix support problems observed in the PEO/PM structure can only be resolved 
through a cooperative effort of both the Army's PEO and materiel command structure 
leadership." (HQ PMO Review Team Memorandum, 1993) The relationship established 
between the MSC manager and the supported PEO is often driven by human character, 
both good and bad. PEOs and MSC managers who are able to take advantage of the 
good, while eliminating the bad, exercise the leadership necessary to make matrix work. 
As one PM stated, " ... personalities are what makes matrix work, not the organization, and 
the fact that the MICOM commander has the same goals as the PEO makes it easier and 
better." (PM, 1996) 
While professional relationships and leadership dictate the overall working 
environment within a PEO and its supporting MSC, leadership and interpersonal skills 
implemented at the program level are important as well. When asked to respond to why 
matrix structure works in program offices, one PM stated, " .. .leadership demonstrated by 
the PM and supervisors along with interpersonal skills gets the response necessary to get 
things done in project offices these days." (PM, 1996) Another PM added to this 
inference by stating: 
Managing the program office has leadership associated with it, and involves 
erasing the distinction between core and collocated matrix workers so that people 
do not think about it...all team building and total quality management (TQM) 
should be done so that there is no visible difference and you have to stop and 
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think who is core and who is matrix. This creates environments of loyalty and 
this makes a big difference in the way people think about themselves and the 
program. (PM, 1996) 
Beyond any other answer given on how to best optimize the matrix structure within 
project offices, PMs overwhelmingly chose the proper implementation of leadership. 
While this answer can never serve as a cure-all for each of the weaknesses found within 
the matrix structure, it can provide solutions designed to enhance worker loyalty, 
commitment, and the sense of belonging. As one PM stated, " ... we have good leadership 
and interpersonal skills which can make any organization work if we want to make it 
happen." (PM, 1996) 
While one overwhelming program manager, MSC manager, and Headquarters 
PMO Review Team answer for improving matrix structure involves implementation of 
quality leadership, personnel relationships, and interpersonal skills, the Headquarters PMO 
Review Team introduced one additional facet: increased education. In their findings, the 
team recommended that future plans include education and training in human resource 
management to include training on how to achieve the proper mix of the work force 
(military, civilian, support contractor, core, collocated matrix, non-collocated matrix) and 
their required skills. In the team's opinion, this education and training will assist PMs in 
becoming more proactive in acquiring personnel in a timely manner and replacing 
personnel when their skills are no longer required for the project. Regardless of the 
hierarchial level addressed under the leadership solution, one aspect remains clear: the 
implementation of quality leadership, interpersonal skills, and professional relationships 
designed to enhance the matrix structure's performance are absolutely essential. As one 
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PM stated, "People can make matrix work, and it is through leadership, interpersonal 
skills,and feedback with open communications between functional and project commands 
that yields success." (PM, 1996) While many possible solutions designed to optimize the 
structure may be tested in the near future (and either adopted or discarded), the 
implementation of quality leadership, interpersonal skills, and the importance of personal 
relationships will never become passe. 
5. A Word Regarding Integrated Product Teams 
The introduction of Integrated Product Teams (IPT) at the program level offers 
some interesting aspects with respect to matrix structure. IPTs at the program level are 
designed to support the PM in the development of strategies for contracting, cost 
estimation, evaluation of alternatives, logistics management or other important concerns. 
(Institutionalizing IPTs) In effect, IPTs are comprised of experts from each functional 
area (design engineers, logisticians, production engineers, users, testers, etc.) who are 
empowered by their position to review, make, and implement decisions regarding a 
particular system or subsystem within a program. The desired goal of IPTs is a 
systematic integration and concurrent application of all necessary disciplines throughout 
a system's life cycle to produce an effective and efficient product or process that satisfies 
the customer's needs. (Wagner and White, 1995, p. 34) 
The acceptance and use of IPTs may provide many advantages to project offices 
while eliminating some of the weaknesses of the matrix structure. While this statement 
is bold, it may hold true. The advantages offered by IPTs include team member loyalty, 
empowerment, and a change in perspective (from oversight and condemnation to 
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participator and doer). At least one of the advantages offered by IPTs should sound 
familiar as it was one of the biggest weaknesses which PMs identified regarding the 
matrix structure. As one PM stated, " ... the reason we want to get the IPT under the PM 
is, at least in part, a matter of loyalty ... so that the people working for the team realize that 
the reason they come to work each day is for the betterment of the product." (PM, 1996) 
Thus, the ability of IPTs to create environments of cohesion and mutual benefit enables 
personnel (core and matrix alike) to become conduits, rather than obstacles, to progress. 
The ideas regarding teaming and IPTs have just started to gain support within 
Army project offices. According to some of the PMs interviewed, IPTs of the future 
should consist of core and matrix personnel who work directly with contractor personnel 
in the contractor's office. In this way, the role of core and matrix personnel will change 
from oversight to one of decision making and participation within the contractor's 
development processes. 
While IPTs may be the trend of the future, they must still find a way to overcome 
the cultural hurdles which face them today. The first of these hurdles is the concept of 
empowerment. The nature of IPTs dictate that individual members are empowered to 
make decisions without necessarily obtaining approval from the PM. This cultural "leap 
of faith" is likely to take time, as the entire establishment must have confidence in the 
level of competency and decision-making capability of each empowered worker. This is 
because the decisions made by individual members of the team will affect the entire end 
product. (PMIMSC manager, 1996) 
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The next cultural hurdle facing IPTs involves some current PM philosophies 
regarding the timing and duration of their use. While many PMs have began to 
incorporate the ideas of the IPT type structure within their offices, others have chosen to 
maintain their offices in the status quo, establishing IPTs only when necessary. As one 
PM stated, "IPTs should be used for specific issue-driven, issue-resolution 
decisions ... where they are issue-driven, hard-hitting, and short-duration to make decisions, 
they are great." (PM, 1996) 
The final IPT cultural change which must be addressed involves the personnel mix. 
Since IPTs consist of members who are empowered with decision-making authority, 
members of the team (both core and matrix) will likely be comprised of higher grade 
levels. This situation is likely to create a need for changes in the grade level manning 
requirements of both core and matrix personnel within program offices. (PM/MSC 
manager, 1996) What will the impact be? At this point, the question is hard to answer 
because pure IPTs are only embryonic at this point. However, the question remains, and 
must be addressed in the future if pure and empowered IPTs are to provide a more 
efficient and effective structure within Army project offices. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce the strengths the weaknesses of the 
matrix structure which PMs have observed in Army acquisition project offices. In 
addition, the chapter also discussed some of the organizational variants and methods 
which PMs feel can be used to optimize the structure. From this discussion, PMs and 
MSC managers identified two broad categories of strengths offered by the matrix 
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structure: the attributes of flexibility and increased access to knowledge. While 
flexibility was unanimously offered as the greatest benefit of the matrix structure, 
increased access to knowledge proved to be more beneficial to smaller project and product 
offices. 
While cognizant of its strengths, PMs and MSC managers also acknowledged the 
weaknesses inherent to the matrix structure. These included both worker loyalty and 
worker selectivity. The worker loyalty weakness included the aspects of matrix employee 
allegiance, and the performance evaluations and award system. The worker selectivity 
weakness discussed the inability of the PM to control the selection process of matrix 
employees who worked for him, as well as his inability to control both the timing and 
rationale behind personnel replacements. In addition, this section introduced the 
difficulties encountered by the PM in obtaining matrix support from MSCs other than the 
program's primary MSC, as well as the growing concern over the lack of technically 
competent personnel. 
The chapter concluded with a discussion of how PMs have attempted to optimize 
the current matrix structure. This discussion included the aspects and importance of 
collocation, involvement of the PM in performance evaluations and rewarding of matrix 
workers, the importance of leadership and interpersonal relationships, and finally, the 
importance of MSCs developing a customer focus. The final issue addressed in this 
chapter was the concept of IPTs. This discussion was introduced in order to address one 
possible organizational variant which may enable the matrix structure to become more 
effective and efficient in the future. While the concept of IPTs may enhance the 
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performance of project offices in the future, several issues regarding pay grades and 
competency levels must be addressed before the concept is allowed to evolve from the 
experimental stage into a universally-employed organizational form. 
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V. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY 
The information obtained during the course of this thesis suggests that matrix 
structure can operate within Army acquisition program offices. While the structure has 
many weaknesses, PMs and MSC managers have found ways to optimize the 
organizational form into one which operates effectively. By implementing the suggestions 
made by PMs and MSC managers concerning ways to improve the structure, matrix may 
eventually evolve into an organizational form which can work effectively and efficiently 
in today's environment of shrinking budgets and streamlined costs. While innovative 
thinking and proactive leadership at the PM and MSC manager levels have spearheaded 
the effort to improve the level and quality of support provided to program offices, senior 
leadership within the Army must be willing to join the march. Failure to obtain senior 
level support and commitment to improve the structure will only result in wide variances 
in effectiveness between different PEOs and MSCs throughout the Army (a condition 
which, not surprisingly, exists today). 
What is the best policy for implementing matrix? The results of this thesis show 
that it is not just one aspect. Instead, it is a combination of measures which should be 
used concurrently in order to maximize the structure's effectiveness. In the end, the best 
answer for improving matrix may be " ... to completely tum over functional personnel 
entirely to the program office when they are moved to the program." (PM/MSC manager, 
1996) In this way, PMs will be in a better position to take advantage of matrix's 
strengths while minimizing and/or eliminating its weaknesses. 
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B. CONCLUSIONS ON RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What are the possible methods or organizational variants which can be used • 
improve or optimize the matrix organizational structure as an effective form of 
management within Army acquisition program management offices? 
Based on the information obtained from PMs and MSC managers, the 
answer to this question involves a combination of four methods and the possible 
implementation of one organizational variant. The first method involves the issue of 
collocation. Each of the PMs interviewed believed that there is a significant difference 
between the level of support received from a collocated matrix worker verses that from 
a non-collocated one. According to many of the PMs, collocating matrix workers within 
the program office assists in resolving the loyalty weakness inherent to the structure. This 
is because collocated workers identify with the program office over time, eventually 
adopting a project-oriented identity. This "sense of belonging" is extremely important 
with respect to worker loyalty. 
The second method involves the concepts of customer focus and teaming. With 
the shrinking of the defense budget and subsequent reductions in both military and 
civilian personnel, PEOs and MSCs have become more and more interdependent. Major 
subordinate commands have realized that in order to survive, they must receive and fulfill 
support requests demanded by PMs and PEOs. Additionally, MSCs now implement 
Quarterly Evaluation Reports in an attempt to promote customer relations between 
themselves and the PEOs they support. Closely related to the customer focus concept is 
the spirit of teaming. Major. subordinate commands and PMs have realized that their 
72 
relationships must be built on trust and collaboration to survive. The history of animosity 
which frequently existed between the two must remain in the past in order for each to 
remain effective in an era of shrinking budgets. 
The third method which PMs identified as a way to improve matrix structure 
involves worker performance evaluations. While policy dictates that PMs are to have 
rater or senior rater input into matrix worker performance evaluations, many as yet do not. 
The effect of not allowing the PM to be involved in the rating chain results in his 
inability to completely influence worker performance. The failure of PEOs and MSCs to 
universally implement the guidance dictated by AR 70-1 has impeded the initiatives 
designed to enhance the overall performance of the matrix structure. 
The fourth method PMs use to optimize matrix structure involves the role of 
leadership. The relationship between MSC managers and PEOs involves leadership issues 
which must be addressed. A quality, professional, and self-respecting relationship 
between individual PMs and the supporting commands is critical to the quality of support 
provided. If the matrix structure is to become increasingly efficient, it will require the 
cooperative effort of both the PEO/PM and MSC leadership. While the professional 
relationship between PMs and MSC managers is important, the role leadership plays in 
optimizing matrix must permeate many levels. As stated in Chapter IV, quality 
leadership, personnel relationships, and interpersonal skills are essential elements which 
PMs must possess in order to optimize a structure in which worker loyalty and 
commitment are critical issues. While leadership will never be a cure-all for every 
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weakness found within the matrix structure, it can provide solutions designed to enhance 
worker loyalty, commitment, and sense of belonging. 
The organizational variant which PMs cited as offering potential with respect to 
optimizing the matrix structure is the use of program level IPTs. The advantages offered 
by these IPTs include team member loyalty, empowerment, and a change in perspective 
from oversight and condemnation to participator and doer. While the use of IPTs may 
eliminate the problems associated with loyalty (by instead creating environments of 
cohesion and mutual benefit), it faces many cultural hurdles. If these hurdles can be 
addressed, the use IPTs as a matrix variant may offer a more efficient and effective 
structure for Army program offices. 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
a. What is matrix structure, and when is it used? 
Matrix structure is an organizational form in which individual workers 
belong to one manager (department head) while working as part of a concerted effort 
(defined as a project) under a different manager (project manager). Matrix employees are 
able to work as part of a program for a period of time, returning to their functional base 
and duties when the program no longer requires their support. In tum, these employees 
may remain with the functional base for a long period of time, or be reassigned to other 
programs which require their expertise. 
According to Davis and Lawrence, matrix structure 1s normally used by 
organizations which find themselves in environments of outside pressure for dual focus, 
pressure for high information-processing capacity, and pressure for shared resources. 
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While arguments can be made with respect to the primary reason why the Army adopted 
the matrix structure, the pressure for shared resources under conditions of shrinking 
budgets and streamlined costs may top the list. 
b. What are the published benefits and weaknesses of matrix 
structures? 
The published strengths of the matrix structure include the following: 
ability to manage dual environmental demands, flexible use of specialized personnel, 
adaptability to external change, and personal skills development. While the ability to 
manage dual environmental demands includes the published intent of empowering 
decision makers at lower levels than in conventional organizations, this strength has yet 
to be universally realized in Army program offices. The next matrix strength, flexible use 
of personnel, consists of the ability to assign and reassign specialists in order to maximize 
both their potential, as well as the needs of the projects they represent. Closely related 
to the flexibility strength, is matrix's adaptability to external change. This strength is 
important as it allows new activities to be incorporated or cancelled without a drastic 
change to the overall matrix structure. The last published matrix strength is personal 
skills development. In theory, matrix structure allows employees to become more 
energetic, self-starting, and team players. However, each of these traits must be 
developed through proper training on the workings, environment, and stresses associated 
with the matrix structure. 
Matrix structure has weaknesses as well. The published weaknesses include 
authority ambiguity, management conflict/power struggles, worker conflict and confusion, 
communication, and anarchy. Authority ambiguity occurs when there are no clear lines 
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of authority regarding decision-making responsibilities between project and functional 
managers. Workers can often become confused as to which manager's decision is final, 
and which is not. Management conflict (and ensuing power struggles) is common to 
matrix organizations which do not establish clear lines of authority as well. Under this 
weakness, functional and project managers each attempt to gain control, creating "turf 
war" conflicts throughout the organization. Worker conflict and confusion occurs when 
collocated matrix workers believe that regardless of the quality of their work, other 
workers involved in performing equivalent tasks at their functional base's home station 
will be given preferable treatment on performance evaluations and other systemic rewards. 
This weakness is common in matrix organizations which do not allow the project office 
to take part in matrix worker performance evaluations. The communication weakness 
inherent to matrix structure has several causes. These include: the continual change of 
personnel, the increased number of managerial layers, and the interdependencies of a 
structure which requires increased communication. While advances in communications 
technology offers several solutions to this weakness, it is by no means a cure-all. Instead, 
technological advances must occur in conjunction with increases in the amount of training 
provided for managers and technical personnel alike. The final published matrix 
weakness is anarchy. Anarchy occurs when employees are reluctant to change as the 
organization adopts the matrix structure. This fear of the "unknown" often results in 
direct worker sabotage of the structure. 
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c. What is DoD's posture on the use of matrix structures? 
The DoD uses the matrix structure in order to take advantage of its ability 
to operate effectively under conditions of shrinking budgets, streamlined costs, and 
increasing technical specialization. Army Regulation 70-1 provides a distinct breakdown 
of both the supported (project office) and supporting (Army Materiel Command) 
commands. According to AR 70-1, PEOs and program managers are given the authority 
and resources to manage program cost, schedule, and performance. Meanwhile, the 
regulation states that the Army Materiel Command, and its subordinate MSCs, are to 
provide the support needed by the PEOs in such a way as to ensure program success. 
This support consists of both material and personnel. 
While AR 70-1 provides some insight into the Army's use of the matrix structure, 
PEOs and PMs receive their guidance concerning personnel requirements through the 
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition's (ASARDA) 
TDA. The TDA dictates how many core personnel each program office is authorized to 
employ. Any other support that a PM requires is then filled by the office's supporting 
MSC. While the general guidance is the same throughout the entire Army, variability 
between PEOs, and program offices within PEOs, remains. Although standardization 
within all PEOs is an issue under current debate by senior Army leadership, many PMs 
have commented that PEOs should retain the right to direct the development, acquisition, 
modification, and fielding of assigned programs. 
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d. What are the actual benefits and weaknesses of using matrix 
structure in Army acquisition program offices? 
The two matrix structure benefits which PMs cited were both flexibility and 
an increased access to knowledge. Flexibility is universally accepted as the greatest 
matrix strength. The ability to quickly add or delete personnel from the program is an 
attribute which is greatly appreciated by the PMs. Program managers cited this benefit 
as an essential one, as it is used extensively when a program moves through a milestone 
decision into its next phase. The increased access to knowledge benefit involves the 
· ability of a matrix worker to draw upon large amounts of experience and knowledge from 
his peers who remain at the functional base. This attribute allows individuals with limited 
expertise to be able to draw on experience from within their functional area to help them 
surmount the hurdles which they do not have the necessary expertise to conquer 
themselves. While this strength allows smaller project offices to have increased access 
to talent that they would not normally be able to obtain, it is not as critical to larger 
programs. 
Matrix weaknesses were summarized under two broad categories: worker loyalty, 
and worker selectivity. Worker loyalty involved the facets of motivation and allegiance. 
This weakness involved discussion on the loyalty differences between collocated and non-
collocated matrix workers. Similarly, the inability of many PMs to be involved in matrix 
worker performance evaluations comprises another facet under this weakness. The worker 
selectivity weakness is summarized as the inability of the PM to have complete control 
in determining which matrix worker he is provided. Facets under this weakness include 
barriers in accessing matrix workers from other MSCs, MSC replacement of matrix 
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workers without proper cause, and a growing lack of competent Government technical 
personnel. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are offered by this researcher and are based upon 
both the researcher's assessment of the literature and the interviews conducted. 
Recommendation #1: If the matrix structure is to become more effective and 
efficient within Army program offices, then steps must be taken to address the comments 
of the PMs interviewed during the course of this thesis. Several of the methods identified 
by the PMs are capable of being adopted immediately. These include involvement of the 
PM in the performance evaluation and reward structure of collocated, and at times, non-
collocated matrix workers. While AR 70-1 and Army Acquisition Executive Policy 
Memorandum 91-4 require this involvement, PMs within many PEOs still lack this 
authority. Until changes are made, PMs within many PEOs will continue lack total 
control over what is happening with the personnel in their organizations. 
The next method which must be incorporated is a complete saturation of the 
customer focus initiatives introduced by some MSCs. Until each MSC understands who 
their customers are, and how to best support them, program manager conflicts and 
dissatisfactions with the matrix structure will continue. It is time to introduce the aspects 
of interdependence and teaming, instead of continuing with the philosophies of 
independence and isolationism. 
The leadership and innovation demonstrated by PMs in their efforts to enhance the 
matrix structure cannot go without recognition. Leadership's role in the development of 
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binding relationships between MSC managers and PEOs deserves further analysis and 
discussion. If the matrix structure is to become more effective and efficient, then 
relationships supporting the aspects of teaming and mutual respect must be initiated at the 
highest levels within the Army's PEO and materiel command structures. Binding 
relationships at this level will only flow downward, further cu1tivating environments of 
leadership commitment and worker loyalty. 
While collocation has been cited as one possible way to build matrix worker 
loyalty and commitment, it is an infeasible solution for PMs who lack the office space 
or do not require the use of certain talents on a continual basis. However, if the PM has 
· a choice as to whether to collocate his full time matrix support, the answer provided by 
the interviewed PMs is clear: yes, because it can only help encourage worker loyalty! 
Recommendation #2: Senior leadership within the Army must continue to 
support further experiments with the use of IPTs at the program level. Many IPTs are 
beginning to show signs of promise which must be further analyzed. An example of this 
is evident within the Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missile (EFOGM) project, where the 
program office's matrix and core personnel are working side-by-side with the contractor, 
in the contractor's own plant. Information obtained during the course of this project may 
revolutionize the way program offices operate in the future. As stated earlier, if matrix 
is to become more efficient and effective, worker loyalty and commitment are essential. 
The implementation of IPTs into program offices helps ensure that these two traits have 
a better chance of becoming inherent. 
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While IPTs show promise, several issues must be addressed in the future if the 
attributes of worker empowerment and decision-making authority are to be fully 
implemented. These issues include both cultural changes and grade level mannmg 
requirements. While it is clear that neither of these issues has an easy answer, program 
test-beds and experiments must be supported in order to further analyze the advantages 
offered by this organizational variant. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The following are two recommendations for further research regarding matrix 
structure in Army program offices. 
1. An analysis of the differences in the number and type of matrix verses core 
personnel in a program office represents one challenge. To support this, 
a case study could be conducted which would compare the Armored Gun 
System's solution (a core made up of technical personnel) with another 
program which possesses a core of administrative personnel and relies on 
matrix support to provide technical expertise to the program. 
2. A case study of the experimental use of IPTs in the EFOGM program 
offers another challenge. This case-study oriented thesis would document 
the use of program level IPTs (consisting of both core and matrix 
personnel) who are working side-by-side with Rayethon Corporation (in the 
contractor's own plant) to develop the EFOGM for the Army. This 
experimental use of an IPT is breaking new ground in Huntsville, Alabama, 
and may offer some answers to the questions regarding the widespread use 
of IPTs (cultural changes and grade level manning requirements). 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Army adopted the matrix structure in an attempt to provide its program offices 
with increased integration and coordination of specialties under conditions of shrinking 
budgets and streamlined costs. This change in organizational structure and culture has 
led to the successful implementation of numerous state-of-the-art technologies in weapon 
81 
systems. While few will argue with the matrix structure's effectiveness toward enabling 
these systems to support the Army's many missions, many question the structure's 
efficiency. This is due, in part, to the many matrix weaknesses which have surfaced 
over time. Until solutions to these weaknesses are found, program managers throughout 
the Army will continue to face obstacles which impede, rather than facilitate, effective 
program management. 
The intent of this thesis was to identify and discuss possible solutions to the 
weaknesses inherent to the matrix structure. Input regarding these solutions was obtained 
from the individuals who must work with the system daily: the program and MSC 
managers. Their responses have provided this research with some interesting conclusions. 
If the matrix structure is to become more efficient in the future, the ideas offered in this 
thesis must be analyzed. After all, who knows more about the system and structure than 
those who have been given the responsibility to implement it? 
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